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This paper examines proposals for decision making with Dempster–Shafer belief functions
from the perspectives of requirements for rational decision under ignorance and sequential
consistency. The focus is on the proposals by Jaffray & Wakker and Giang & Shenoy applied
for partially consonant belief functions. We formalize the concept of sequential consistency
of an evaluation model and prove results about sequential consistency of Jaffray–Wakker’s
model and Giang–Shenoy’s model under various conditions. We demonstrate that the often
neglected assumption about two-stage resolution of uncertainty used in Jaffray–Wakker’s
model actually disambiguates the foci of a belief function, and therefore, makes it a partially
consonant on the extended state space.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The belief function theory has the root in Dempster’s effort in 1960s to generalize Bayesian statistics [5] and later Shafer’s
proposal for evidential reasoning [20]. The rich body of accumulated literature encompasses understanding of semantics,
computationmechanisms, andwide range of applications of the belief function theory. Amajormotivation of choosing belief
function theory over probability theory to represent uncertainty is the ability to express, in a more faithful manner, whole
continuum of information availability: from complete ignorance to partial ignorance to full information.
Uncertainty information is useful to the extent that it helps to make correct decisions. When the uncertainty pertinent
to decision is captured by probability, decision making is guided by the established Bayesian decision theory (subjective
expected utility – SEU) which ranks alternatives by their expected utility. One of the reason explaining wide acceptance of
SEU is its rational properties such as dynamic consistency, consequentialism, and immunity from the Dutch-book argument.
In the probabilistic framework, the lack of information (when relevant information fails to entail a probability represen-
tation) is compensated by invoking the principle of insufficient reason or variations such as maximum entropy principle.
The probability obtained by invoking principles of insufficient reason is indistinguishable from probability based on solid
frequency evidence.
Belief function theory can address the issue of lack of information but raises some decision making problems. There
are several proposals by Jaffray [12], Yager [27], Smets and Kennes [22] and Giang and Shenoy [10]. The lack of consen-
sus is an impediment for applications in practice as it raises reasonable questions about the choice of decision method
in a given situation. This paper aims to provide a comparative analysis of the proposals of decision making with belief
functions. The comparison is done from the perspectives of requirements about consistency and rational decision under
ignorance.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section is a brief introduction to belief function theory that provides a
background for subsequent discussion. Section 3 discusses the issues in decision making. The subsequent section has
a review of the proposals for decision making. Section 5 contains a comparison focusing on Jaffray–Wakker’s (JW) and
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Giang–Shenoy’s (GS) proposals. Section 6 discusses the assumption of “two-stage resolution of uncertainty” in the JW
model. Section 7 briefly discusses Yager’s model as well as Smets’ TBMmodel. The final section contains some conclusions.
2. Dempster–Shafer belief functions
An introduction to the DS belief function theory can be found in [20]. For the sake of self-containedness, we provide a
brief review of concepts and notations. Ω is the set of states. Variables are denoted by the capital letters to the end of the
alphabet, e.g., X, Y, Z. Their instances are denoted by lower case letters. A state is a tuple of instances of all variables. Events,
subsets of states, are denoted by capital letters to the start of the alphabet, e.g., A, B, C. A basic probability assignment (bpa)
functionm is defined by
m : 2Ω → [0, 1] such that ∑
A⊆Ω
m(A) = 1. (1)
A subset with positive mass is a focus. Other forms of a belief function are bel (Bel), plausibility (Pl) and commonality (Com)
that are defined fromm as follows: ∀B ⊆ Ω
Bel(B) = ∑
A⊆B
m(A); Pl(B) = ∑
A∩B =∅
m(A); Com(B) = ∑
A⊇B
m(A). (2)
All the forms m, Bel, Pl and Com are equivalent in the sense that given any form the others are completely determined. Bel
is sometimes referred to as belief function. However, in our usage, “belief function” is reserved for the body of information
that has many incarnations m, Bel, Pl and Com. The choice of a form to work with depends on manipulation convenience. In
our case, we use plausibility form largely because of its conditional expression.
The combination of two belief functionsm1,m2 is realized by Dempster’s rule denoted bym1 ⊗ m2. Conditioning is the
most important special case of combination whenm2 is an elementary belief function that has a single focusm2(B) = 1. In
this case the combinationm1 andm2 is also denoted by more familiar notationm1(·|B). In terms of plausibility, conditional
belief assumes the form of conditional probability: PlB(A) = Pl(A∩B)Pl(B) for A, B ⊆ Ω .
DS belief function theory has many interpretations. Dempster [4] views a belief function as the image of probability
distribution on S projected on Ω by a set-valued mapping η : S → 2Ω . The background space S maybe not known to the
decisionmaker (DM). A probability function on Swith Pr(si) = pi andmapping η(si) 
→ Ai induces a belief functionmwith
focim(Ai) = pi. Shafer [20], Smets [21] argue for an interpretation of belief function as representation of evidence without
referring to an underlying probability function. This interpretive difference is often the cause of many disagreements found
in discussion about DS belief functions, including proposals on decision making.
To represent complete ignorance, belief function theory uses the vacuous belief function mvac(Ω) = 1 (equivalently∀B ⊂ Ω,mvac(B) = 0). On the other end of the information availability continuum is the situation described by a probability
function (including deterministic outcome as a special case). Probability function onΩ is just a belief function whose every
focus is a singleton ω ∈ Ω . Between these extremes, the available information allows assigning masses to subsets of Ω .
A non-singleton focus may be interpreted as conditional ignorance, e.g., m(B) ≥ 0 means that there is evidence pointing
toward B as a black box but not anything inside.
Belief function theory provides a well defined framework in which the notion of ambiguity can be discussed.
Definition 1. Given a belief function, an event A is said to be ambiguous if there exists a focus B such that B ∩ A = ∅ and
B∩ A¯ = ∅. B is then called a nonexclusive support of A and A¯. An event that is not ambiguous is called unambiguous. An event
is calledminimally unambiguous if it is unambiguous and any proper subset of it is not unambiguous.
Intuitively, a focus intersecting with both A and A¯ is equivocal in terms of support for the event or its negation. We state
without proof a proposition that characterizes ambiguity in terms of plausibility function.
Theorem 1
(a) A is ambiguous iff Pl(A) + Pl(A¯) > 1.
(b) A is unambiguous iff Pl(A) + Pl(A¯) = 1.
(c) A is unambiguous iff for all B such that A ∩ B = ∅, Pl(A ∪ B) = Pl(A) + Pl(B).
(d) Suppose {Ei}ki=1 is a partition of Ω i.e., ∪iEi = Ω and Ei ∩ Ej = ∅, Ei are unambiguous iff
∑k
i Pl(Ei) = 1.
(e) The collection of unambiguous events forms an algebra (denoted byH).
Because of Bel and Pl duality, these properties can be restated in terms of Bel. This theorem, in particular part (e), provides
a formal foundation to the intuition of treating the plausibility of unambiguous events as standard probability. Note that our
formalization of ambiguity based on belief function is slightly different than the formalization based on the capacity found in
economics literature [8] where unambiguous events do not constitute an algebra, e.g., the intersection of two unambiguous
events may be ambiguous. The difference is due to the fact that while a Bel function is a capacity it is∞-monotone capacity
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and the convex capacity is only 2-monotone (for more details see [2]). A definition of unambiguous events without algebraic
structure, e.g., non-closure under intersection, would raise an obvious question about the validity of treating their capacity
as probability.
3. Issues of decision making with belief functions
Suppose there is a decision maker (DM) or an agent whose knowledge about possible states of the world is encoded by
a belief function and who is concerned with choosing an action among available alternatives. An act is a mapping Ω → O
from the set of statesΩ to the set of outcomesO = [0, 1]. Two acts f , g are equivalent if ∀s ∈ Ω, f (s) = g(s). Outcomes are
measured in risk-adjusted utility rather than monetary unit. This assumption is designed to bypass the issue of risk attitude
and to focus on the issues due to ambiguity. The question how to incorporate risk attitude will be addressed in the last
section.
Besides the mapping notation, an act is also recorded in rule form as a set of rules {Ai ↪→ xi}ki=1 which means “if event
Ai is true then the DM gets outcome xi”. Chain rule E1 ↪→E2 ↪→· · ·↪→Ek ↪→x means “if A1 and A2 and . . . Ak then x”. This
chain rule is equivalent to the rule∧ki=1Ai ↪→x.
Acts are denoted by lower case letters d, f , h, etc. The set of acts is denoted by F . For a fixed measure of uncertainty
over Ω , the DM’s preference over acts is denoted by  which is assumed to be a weak order i.e. is reflexive, complete and
transitive. The symmetric part∼ and asymmetric part of are defined in the usual manner. The restriction of on O is
denoted by symbol≥. Two issues to be discussed in this section are the requirements of rational behavior under ignorance
and dynamic consistency. In the subsequent sections, we will ask how different proposals for decision making with belief
function fare against those requirements.
3.1. Decision under complete ignorance
Asnoted in Section2, an advantageof belief functionover probability is its ability to express various extents of information
availability or lack thereof. For m(A) > 0, an accepted interpretation is that the available information (evidence) points
toward A but not any of its proper subset. In other words, after conditioning on A, m(·|A) has no information about the
realization of states in A (assuming no other focus intersects with A). This reasoning is basis for the proposal by Jaffray and
Wakker [12,13,23].
Decision under ignorance has been discussed by Maskin [16], Cohen and Jaffray [3] and more recently Puppe and Schlag
[18] andLarbi et al. [14]. Theground-breaking result in this areawasmade inearly1950sbyHurwiczandArrow[1]. Intuitively,
due to the lack of information about the realization of a possible state, an act is identified with its set of outcomes. The basic
construct is a choice operator (ˆ ) that for each set of available acts D (is also referred to as decision problem) returns a subset
of optimal acts Dˆ ⊆ D. Arrow and Hurwicz postulated four rational properties that the choice operator must satisfy.
Property A. If D1 ⊂ D2 and Dˆ2 ∩ D1 = ∅ then Dˆ1 = Dˆ2 ∩ D1. The non-empty intersection of a decision problem and the
choice set of a larger decision problem is the choice set of the former.
PropertyB.Relabeling actions and states does not change the optimal status of actions. Formally, if there is one-to-onemapping
a : D1 → D2 and one-to-one mapping s : Ω → Ω such that ∀f ∈ D1,∀ω ∈ Ω f (ω) = a(f )(s(ω)) then f ∈ Dˆ1 iff
a(f ) ∈ Dˆ2.
A stateω ∈ Ω is called duplicatewrt decision problemD if there is anotherω′ ∈ Ω andω = ω′ such that∀f ∈ D, f (ω) =
f (ω′). One can “delete” a duplicate state. Define a new decision problem D′ onΩ ′ = Ω\ω viamapping a such that for each
f ∈ D, a(f ) ∈ D′ and ∀ω ∈ Ω ′, a(f )(ω) = f (ω).
Property C. Deletion of a duplicate state does not change the optimality status of actions. Formally, f ∈ Dˆ iff a(f ) ∈ Dˆ′.
Property D (Dominance). If f ∈ Dˆ and ∀ω ∈ Ω f ′(ω) ≥ f (ω) then f ′ ∈ Dˆ. If f ′ ∈ Dˆ and ∀ω ∈ Ω f ′(ω) ≥ f (ω) then
f ∈ Dˆ.
ArrowandHurwicz shown thatunder “regularity” assumptions, anecessary and sufficient condition for choiceoperator to
satisfypropertiesA−D is that (1) there is aweakorder in the spaceof orderedpairs {〈m,M〉 |m ≤ M} such that 〈m1,M1〉 
〈m2,M2〉 if m1 ≥ m2 and M1 ≥ M2; and (2) Dˆ = {f |∀f ′ ∈ D, 〈minω f (ω),maxω f (ω)〉 ≥ 〈minω f ′(ω),maxω f ′(ω)〉}. This
classic result shows that under complete ignorance, only extreme consequences need to be taken into account by rational
decision maker. In [14], the authors show that this conclusion holds even when acts are viewed as sets of consequences (not
as mappings from states to consequences). Arrow–Hurwicz’s result specifies a family of utility functions includingmax, min
and linear combinations of minimal and maximal values.
3.2. Sequential consistency
The intuitive idea of dynamic consistency can be seen in the law of iterated expectation. Given a probability measure Pr
on Ω , an act d : Ω → O is identified with a random variable V on O defined by ∀x ∈ O, Pr(V = x) = Pr(d−1(x)). In the
SEU model, act d is ranked by its expected utility E[V] (recall that outcomes are measured by risk-adjusted utility). By the
law of iterated expectation, E[V] = E[E[V |E]] where E is another random variable. E[V |E = ei] is the expected utility of
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V if E = ei. Proposition E = ei can be interpreted factually (updating) or counterfactually (planning). To illustrate the point
let us consider the following scenario.
Example 1. An investor considers an investment instrument d whose return, measured as risk-adjusted utility, depends on
two binary variables X (a labor statistics report) and Y (the outcome of a political event of an obscure tribe). d(s00) = 0,
d(s01) = 0.3, d(s10) = 0.3 and d(s11) = 1 where sij denotes the state X = i and Y = j. The labor statistics report is due
tomorrowwhile the political meeting will be concluded in two days. The information about X and Y that investor possesses
is denoted IXY whose nature is left unspecified.
Our investor reasons that both X and Y will be resolved in two days. From today point of view, she has a gamble that has
three possible outcomes depending on which among four states will be realized.
On the other hand, she can also reason that the next day the labor statistics report will be released. In case X = 0, the
instrument becomes dX=0 that has outcomes {0, 0.3} depending on the realization of Y under updated information IY |X=0,
if X = 1 the outcomes of dX=1 are {0.3, 1} under IY |X=1. From tomorrow position, she is indifferent between dX=0 and some
value v0 and between dX=1 and v1. So, from today position, she has a gamble d′ that returns v0 if X = 0 and v1 if X = 1
under the information IX about X . 
Dynamic consistency property that requires the equality of the valuations of d and d′ in the above example, is important
for two reasons. Pragmatically, as the law of iterated expectation, it is basis for important techniques such as the divide-and-
conquer strategy for planning and folding-back computation. Conceptually, it is a rationality statement about, inMcClennen’s
words [17], “consistency between planned choice and actual choice”. It can also be viewed as statement about decision
maker’s information processing efficiency. 1 In this paper, we use sequential consistency in a sense similar to the formulation
by Sarin and Wakker [19]. We formalize this notion.
Definition 2. Suppose H = {Ai}mi=1 is a partition of Ω and Pl is a plausibility function on Ω , the restriction of Pl on
H is a function PlH : 2H → [0, 1] defined on the algebra formed from the elements of partition H such that for any
I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, PlH(∪i∈IAi) 
→ Pl(∪i∈IAi).
The restriction is the result of “coarsening” the frame of reference from Ω to H. To show that function PlH is indeed a
plausibility function on the new frame, it is enough to note that the mass assigned to B is transferred to a focus on the new
frame: ∪i∈IBAi where IB = {i|Ai ∩ B = ∅}.
Definition 3. For an act f = {Ai ↪→ xi}mi=1 and event A ⊂ Ω , conditional act fA is defined to be {Ai ∩ A ↪→ xi|1 ≤ i ≤
m, Ai ∩ A = ∅}.
Definition 4. If f = {Ei ↪→ · · · ↪→ xi}ki=1 then A ↪→ f is the set of rules obtained by prefixing A ↪→to each rule in f i.e.,
A↪→f = {A↪→Ei ↪→· · ·↪→xi}ki=1.
Lemma 1. For any partition H = {Bk}Kk=1 of Ω , f and {Bk ↪→fBk}Kk=1 are equivalent.
It is a standard practice to model preference over acts by a utility function. To discuss sequential consistency we need to
make uncertainty factor explicit. Let P be the set of plausibility functions on Ω and F – the set of acts on the same domain.
FunctionalM : P × F → O is called an evaluation model. An evaluation takes as input a belief function Pl and an act f and
outputs a value in O. For a fixed Pl,M(Pl, ·) is essentially a utility function. Preference relation  is said to be represented
by evaluation modelM if f  f ′ iffM(Pl, f ) ≥ M(Pl, f ′).M is also referred to as the certainty equivalence operator because
the valueM(Pl, f ) ∈ O represents the certainty equivalence of f under Pl.
Definition 5. Suppose Pl is a plausibility function and H = {Ai|1 ≤ i ≤ m} is a partition of Ω . Evaluation modelM is said
to satisfy sequential consistency 2 wrt H if for any act f
M(Pl, f ) = M(PlH, {Ai ↪→M(PlAi , fAi)}mi=1), (3)
where PlH is the restriction of Pl on H; {Ai ↪→M(PlAi , fAi)} is an act defined on H; and PlAi , fAi are obtained by conditioning
Pl and f on Ai.
This definition exposes the relationship between the consistency and the recursiveness of evaluation. A consistentM
evaluates f under Pl by first evaluates each of conditional acts fAi under conditional belief function PlAi and then evaluate{Ai ↪→M(PlAi , fAi)}mi=1 under the restriction of Pl on H. This decomposition is computationally beneficial as it reduces the
complexity. In dynamical settings, after learning Ai is true, the DM can simply evaluateM(PlAi , fAi).
1 In literature, dynamic consistency and a related notion Hammond’s consequentialism [11] are discussed separately whereby consequentialism is described as
“snipping the decision tree at the choice node, throwing the rest of tree away and recalculate the remaining options with the original preference” [15].
2 For the rest of this paper, the term “consistency” is used instead of “sequential consistency” unless the longer form is necessary.
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4. Approaches to decision with belief functions
4.1. Jaffray–Wakker approach
Jaffray [12]proposedanapproach todecisionmakingwithDempster–Shafer belief functionswhichwas furtherdeveloped
in a collaboration with Wakker [13]. Essentially, Jaffray’s approach is the result of combining Savage’s sure-thing principle
applied for unambiguous events with the idea of decision under complete ignorance.
Given bpa m on Ω , each act d : Ω → O induces a belief function fd on O as follows ∀B ⊆ O, mfd(B) =
∑
d(A)=B m(A).
Instead of considering a preference relation on acts, one can examine a preference relation on belief functions. Suppose
B is the set of belief functions on O. Consider a preference relation  on B. For f , g ∈ B, a mixture, ∀B ⊆ O, h(B) =
λf (B) + (1 − λ)g(B), is also in B. Jaffray assumed that  satisfies three conditions. J1 (Weak order)  is complete and
transitive; J2 (Independence) if f , g, h ∈ B, f  g and 0 < λ < 1 then λf + (1− λ)h  λg + (1− λ)h; J3 (Continuity) for
f , g, h ∈ B, f  g  h then there exist λ,μ ∈ (0, 1) such that λf + (1− λ)h  g  μf + (1− λ)h. By von Neumann and
Morgenstern theorem, it follows that  is represented by a linear utility function vJW such that f  g iff vJW (f ) ≥ vJW (f )
and vJW (λf + (1 − λ)g) = λvJW (f ) + (1 − λ)g.
Suppose belief function f has fociB1, B2, . . . , BK , f is a linear combination f = ∑Ki=1 mf (Bi) eBi where eBi is an elementary
belief function with a single focus Bi. It follows from the linearity of vJW
vJW (f ) =
∑
B⊆O
mf (B)vJW (eB). (4)
In [13], the representation in Eq. (4) is arrived by adopting a weakened version of Savage’s sure-thing principle. Namely, two
pairs of acts (d1, d2) and (d
′
1, d
′
2) such that (i) d1(s) = d2(s) = c and d′1(s) = d′2(s) = c′ for all s ∈ A¯; and (ii) d1(v) = d′1(v)
and d2(v) = d′2(v) for all v ∈ A where A is an unambiguous event (Definition 1) should have the same preference direction
i.e., d1  d2 iff d′1  d′2. The weak sure-thing principle requires the unambiguity of the common-outcome sets.
To determine the utility of elementary belief functions vJW (eB) the requirements of decision under ignorance comes
into play because eB has no information about any subset of B. For this purpose, an additional condition J4 (Dominance) is
assumed: eB1  eB2 if ⊥B1 ≥ ⊥B2 andB1 ≥ B2 where ⊥Bi andBi denote the minimal and the maximal elements in Bi
respectively. Clearly, the dominance condition is equivalent to Arrow–Hurwicz’s properties A through D (Section 3.1). With
the assumption of Dominance, it follows that vJW (eB) is a function of the top and the bottom values in B while the form of
that function is not given. A most convenient form that fits the requirement is a linear combination which is also known
under the name Hurwicz α criterion
vJW (eB) = αB⊥B + (1 − αB)B, (5)
where 0 ≤ αB ≤ 1 is a constant that depends on the values⊥B andB only. Hence the utility expression of a general belief
function is
vJW (f ) =
∑
B⊆O
mf (B) (αB⊥B + (1 − αB)B) . (6)
Wakker [24] notes “[Jaffray’smodels] achieve a tractability and a separation between risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and
ambiguity beliefs that have not yet been obtained in other models popular today”. The separation of the factors involved
in decision making is clear. The ambiguity attitude is accounted for by αB. The ambiguity belief is represented by values
mf (B). In Eq. (6), the risk attitude is not visible because in our presentation the outcomes are measured by risk-adjusted
utility (Section 3). If such an assumption was not made, the risk attitude would be represented by a function u applied for
outcomes⊥B,B.
However, the tractability of this model remains an issue. As Hurwicz index αB depends on⊥B andB, the total number is
about a half of the square of the number of outcomes. This requirement makes the approach impractical for problems with
many possible outcomes, in particular for a real interval as we assume in this paper. Parametrization of the Hurwicz index
function is a viable remedy, in particular, to assume α is a constant that is unique for a decision maker and does not depend
on B.
4.2. Giang–Shenoy’s approach
In [10], Giang and Shenoy propose a decision model for partially consonant belief functions or pcb. The fundamental
importance of pcb is due to Walley’s result [25] that pcb is the only class of DS belief functions that is consistent with the
likelihood principle of statistics.
Definition 6. A belief function is called partially consonant if its foci can be divided into non-overlapping groups and within
each group, they are telescopically nested, e.g., A10 ⊃ A11 ⊃ · · · ⊃ A1n1 , A20 ⊃ A21 ⊃ · · · ⊃ A2n2 , . . . , Am0 ⊃ Am1 ⊃· · · ⊃ Amnm and Ai0 ∩ Aj0 = ∅. Each sequence of foci Ai0 ⊃ Ai1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Aini is called a telescope.
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We can assume without loss of information that ∪iAi0 = Ω as a state that does not belong to any focus can be ignored.
This class includes both probability and possibility functions as special cases. Note that algebra A formed from partition
{A10, A20, . . . , Am0} is the algebra of unambiguous events and conditional plausibility PlA0i(·) is a possibility function.
Definition 7. Given a set S, a possibility function is a function π : 2S → [0, 1] that satisfies two conditions (1) maxw∈S
π(w) = 1 and (2) ∀A, B ⊆ S, π(A ∪ B) = max(π(A), π(B)).
A pcb can be decomposed into a probability function onA: Pr(Ai0) def= Pl(Ai0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m andm conditional possibility
functions πi on Ai0: πi(C) = PlAi0(C) for C ⊆ Ai0. This approach to decision making with pcb combines the ideas of decision
with probability and decision with possibility.
Definition 8. Given a pcb inDefinition 6, for act d = {Ei ↪→wi}ki=1, its pcb form is defined as follows: d′ = {Ai0 ↪→{Ai0∩Ej ↪→
wj}kj=1}mi=1.
Note important facts (1) d and d′ are equivalent i.e., ∀s ∈ Ω, d(s) = d′(s); and (2) given a pcb, the pcb form of any act
is uniquely determined. Therefore, instead of directly evaluating an act one can evaluate its pcb form.
Since Pl(Ai0) are probability and PlAi0(Bik) are possibility, the first stage of d
′ is a probabilistic act and the second stage
has possibilistic acts. In a folding-back process, possibilistic acts are evaluated and their certainty equivalences are plugged
into the probabilistic lottery which, in its turn, is evaluated by expected utility. Set Li = {Ai0 ∩ Ej ↪→wj}kj=1, the utility of d′
can be computed by u({Ai0 ↪→Li}mi=1) =
∑m
i=1 Pl(Ai0)u(Li).
According to a decision theory proposed in [9], possibilistic acts are evaluated by utility function t : Fπ → Ψ where Fπ
is the set of possibilistic functions on O and Ψ is the set of pairs defined below
Ψ
def= {〈λ, ρ〉 |0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and max(λ, ρ) = 1}. (7)
An order  onΨ , a component-wise operation cmax on pairs and the product of a scalar and a pair are defined as follows:
〈λ, ρ〉 
〈
λ′, ρ′
〉
iff λ ≥ λ′ and ρ ≤ ρ′, (8)
cmax{〈λ, ρ〉 ,
〈
λ′, ρ′
〉
} def=
〈
max(λ, λ′),max(ρ, ρ′)
〉
, (9)
π 〈λ, ρ〉 def= 〈πλ, πρ〉 . (10)
The utility of a possibilistic act {Bij ↪→wj}kj=1 with πij = PlA0i(Bij) and t(wj) =
〈
λj, ρj
〉
is calculated by formula
t({Bij ↪→wj}kj=1) = cmax
j
{πijt(wj)} =
〈
max
j
(πijλj),max
j
(πijρj)
〉
. (11)
For continuous t, one can define “inverse” function t−1 : Ψ → [0, 1] by:
w ∈ [0, 1], t−1(〈λ, ρ〉) 
→ w if t(w) = 〈λ, ρ〉 . (12)
This definition uphold familiar cancellations: t(t−1(〈λ, ρ〉)) = 〈λ, ρ〉 and t−1(t(w)) = w. The utility function for pcb
lotteries [10] has the form
u({Ai0 ↪→{Bij ↪→wj}kj=1}mi=1) =
m∑
i=1
Pl(Ai0) t
−1(cmax
j
{PlAi0(Bij)t(wj)}). (13)
It can be verified that when pcb is a probability function on Ω , u(d) reduces to E[d] and if pcb is a possibility function
u(d) = t−1(cmaxw{Pl(d−1(w)) t(w)}).
5. Comparative analysis of decision models for belief functions
We have seen two ways of evaluating decisions under uncertainty described by DS belief functions. Jaffray–Wakker’s
model is developed for the general case while Giang–Shenoy’s model in [10] is for an important class of partially consonant
belief function. It is interesting to understand their difference. The logic of our inquiry is simple. We want to see if the JW
model is equivalent to the GSmodel when the belief function is pcb, in particular how do they fare against the requirements
of decision under ignorance and consistency. For clarity, term JW-utility is used for the utility function v given in (6) and
GS-utility for function u given in (13). Several cases will be analyzed. The case of unambiguous partition is considered in
Section 5.1 where both JW-model and GS-model are shown to be consistent. Sections 5.2 (belief is ignorance) and 5.3 (belief
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is a possibility function) are devoted for ambiguous partitions where JW-model and GS-model behave differently. The latter
is consistent while the former is not. Finally, we formulate in Section 5.4 sufficient conditions for consistency on decision
trees.
5.1. The case of unambiguous partition
We will show that for unambiguous partitions, both JW- and GS-utilities are consistent wrt any unambiguous partition.
Theorem2. SupposePl is apcb, both Jaffray–Wakker’s andGiang–Shenoy’s evaluationmodelsare consistentwrtanyunambiguous
partition.
In a sense, this result is not surprising. The primary object in Jaffray’s theory is the mixture of acts. The main formula
(Eq. (4)) is derived from the satisfaction of Independence (J2) and Continuity (J3) axioms on mixtures. But the mixture
λf + (1 − λ)g can be obtained from act {head ↪→ f , tail↪→g} where {head, tail} is the unambiguous partition of variable
Coinwith Pr(head) = λ. The case of ambiguous partition ismore interesting andwill be considered in next two subsections.
5.2. The case of ignorance
The obvious and the simplest case to look into is decision under ignorance i.e., elementary belief functions on O which
have only one focus. Suppose eB is such a belief function with a single focus B and meB(B) = 1. Technically, eB is a belief
function on O. Before using GS-utility, it is necessary to specify a map from Ω to O and a belief function Pl that induce eB.
An act dB such that dB(A) = B and an elementary belief function on Ω , m(A) = 1 will suffice. Denote by Ai = d−1(bi)
for each bi ∈ B. So, dB has the form {Ai ↪→ bi|bi ∈ B} which is a possibilistic act because ∀i, Pl(Ai) = 1. The GS-utility is
then u(dB) = t−1 (cmax{t(bi)|bi ∈ B}). Suppose t(⊥B) = 〈λ⊥B , ρ⊥B 〉, t(B) = 〈λB , ρB 〉 and t(b) = 〈λb, ρb〉. BecauseB  b for any b ∈ B by the definition of  in (8) the left components satisfy λB ≥ λb for any b ∈ B. Similarly, because
b  ⊥B then the right components satisfy ρ⊥B ≥ ρb for any b ∈ B. Therefore
u(dB) = t−1(cmax{t(bi)|bi ∈ B}) = t−1(〈λB , ρ⊥B 〉). (14)
Clearly, u(dB) depends on ⊥B and B only. Although (5) and (14) look different, they agree in ignoring intermediate
outcomes. Referring to Section 3.1, we see that both JW-utility and GS-utility pass a rationality test for decision under
ignorance, namely, Arrow–Hurwicz’s properties A to D.
On the surface, a difference between the two approaches is that while in (5) belief function does not enter explicitly, it
does so in (14) as the result of vacuous belief function Pl(Ai) = 1. In other words, the JW approach treats decision under
ignorance as a singular case while in the GS approach, it is just an ordinary case applied for the vacuous belief function.
A more substantial difference is uncovered under a close examination of the consistency requirement under ignorance.
Example 2. Consider the investment problem described in Example 1. In addition, it is assumed that our investor is ignorant
about both variables, all she knows is d(s00) = 0, d(s01) = 0.3, d(s10) = 0.3 and d(s11) = 1 where sij denotes the state
X = i and Y = j.
According to Jaffray–Wakker’s model, since d has outcomes {0, 0.3, 1}. With Hurwicz pessimism index α, the certainty
equivalence is (1 − α).
On theotherhand, she canalso reasonas follows. Thenextdaywhen the labor statistics reportwill be released, ifX = 0 the
instrument has outcomes {0, 0.3}, if X = 1 the outcomes are {0.3, 1}. In each case, she remains ignorant because knowing X
does not inform anyhow about Y . Hence, the certainty equivalence is 0.3(1−α) if X = 0 and (1−0.7α) if X = 1. From today
position, she faces a decision that ends eitherwith 0.3(1−α)or (1−0.7α)depending on the labor statistics reportwhich she
is ignorant about. UsingHurwicz criterion, the certainty equivalence is 0.3(1−α)α+(1−α)(1−0.7α) = (1−α)(1−0.4α).
Except α ∈ {0, 1}, this value is strictly less than the ce value of d calculated directly. What is wrong?
According to Giang–Shenoy’s model, she evaluates the investment instrument by Eq. (14). Suppose that t(0) = 〈0, 1〉,
t(0.3) = 〈0.7, 1〉, t(0.4) = 〈1, 1〉 and t(1) = 〈1, 0〉, u(d) = t−1(cmax(〈0, 1〉 , 〈0.7, 1〉 , 〈0, 1〉)) = 0.4. She can evaluate
the instrument conditional on X = 0 which is u(dX=0) = t−1(cmax(〈0, 1〉 , 〈0.7, 1〉)) = t−1(〈0.7, 1〉) = 0.3 and on
X = 1, u(dX=1) = t−1(cmax(〈0, 7, 1〉 , 〈1, 0〉)) = t−1(〈1, 1〉) = 0.4. And finally, for a decision d′ that ends up with either
dX=0 or dX=1, u(d′) = t−1(cmax(〈0.7, 1〉 , 〈1, 1〉)) = t−1(〈1, 1〉) = 0.4. Clearly, u(d) = u(d′). 
In this example, investor’s Hurwicz index is assumed to be invariant that is more restricted than the description found in
the original paper [12] where such index is allowed to be sensitive to the outcome ranges. Setting aside the impracticality of
constructing such a function for a large outcome set, the example indicates a deeper problem which will be explored. The
question is how to find a function α(·, ·) that is immune to the described inconsistency?
For a moment, let us step back from belief function notation and denote the state of lack of information or ignorance by
IG. An important characteristic of ignorance is invariance wrt the change of the frame of reference. It seems reasonable to
argue that changing the reference frame, at least coarsening, by itself does not create any new information that can alter the
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knowledge status from ignorance into something other than that. The same argument can be used wrt conditionalization.
Suppose that you start with ignorance on Ω and learn “A ⊂ Ω is true”, then conditionalization on A should produce
ignorance on A because the information “A ⊂ Ω is true” has been used to exclude the states outside A and this information
does not render anything regarding the states inside A.
Assumption 1 (Invariance of ignorance). Suppose IGΩ is the ignorance on Ω and H = {Ai}ki=1 is a partition of Ω then the
restriction of IGΩ on H (IGH) and for all i conditionalization on Ai (IGAi ) are ignorance.
Walley [26] proposes a similar representation invariance principle (RIP) to capture the intuitive notion of ignorance ac-
cording to which “the posterior upper and lower probabilities assigned to an observable event A should not depend on the
sample space Q inwhich A and the previous observations are represented”. It is easy to show that the vacuous belief function
satisfies this assumption. For belief function f withmf (Ω) = 1, (1) ∀A ⊂ Ω , the conditional belief function fA has A as the
single focus; and (2) for any partition H of Ω , f H is again vacuous. It is also interesting to note that no probability function
would satisfy this assumption. Specifically, because of additivity, changing the frame of reference (e.g., coarsening) will turn
a uniform distribution into a non-uniform distribution.
After insistence that decision under ignorance is nothing but decision with vacuous belief functions, the next logical step
is to require the satisfaction of consistency. For that purpose, we rewrite Eq. (3) to
M(IGΩ, f ) = M(IGH, {Ai ↪→M(IGAi , fAi)}mi=1), (15)
where H = {Ai}mi=1 is a partition of Ω . By Arrow–Hurwicz’s theoremM(IGΩ, f ) must be a function of two extreme values
min(f (Ω)) and max(f (Ω)) i.e.,
M(IGΩ, f ) ≡ γ (min(f (Ω)),max(f (Ω))).
for some γ . Consider f such that f (Ω) = [m,M]. For any h ∈ (m,M), set Ah = f−1([m, h]), it follows that A¯h = f−1((h,M])
where (h,M] is an open interval. Application of (15) for partition {Ah, A¯h} yields
∀h ∈ (m,M), γ (m,M) = γ (γ (m, h), γ (h,M)). (16)
In addition to (16), γ must satisfy two properties ∀x ∈ [0, 1], γ (x, x) = x and γ (x, y) ≥ γ (x′, y′) if x ≥ x′ and y ≥ y′. The
former property or unanimity is a natural requirement in the case of certainty about act’s outcome i.e., its set of consequences
is a singleton. The latter is the dominance condition of Arrow–Hurwicz’s theorem. The characterization of function γ is given
by the following theorem.
Theorem3. Let = {(x, y)|0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1} – the set of ordered pairs of numbers in the unit interval. Function γ :  → [0, 1]
is continuous on each argument and satisfies three conditions:
(i) Unanimity: γ (x, x) = x;
(ii) Dominance: if x ≥ x′, y ≥ y′ then γ (x, y) ≥ γ (x′, y′); and
(iii) Decomposability: ∀x, y, z such that 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ z ≤ 1
γ (x, z) = γ (γ (x, y), γ (y, z)) (17)
iff there exists a value a ∈ [0, 1] for which
γ (x, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
y if y ≤ a,
x if x ≥ a,
a if x ≤ a ≤ y.
(18)
We prove a simple lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose γ satisfies properties (i), (ii) and (iii). If γ (x, 1) = a > x for some x ∈ [0, 1] then∀y ∈ [x, a], γ (y, 1) = a.
Similarly, if γ (0, z) = a < z for some z ∈ [0, 1] then ∀y ∈ [a, z], γ (0, y) = a.
Having characterized an evaluation function that satisfies consistency in addition to the propertiesA throughD, we return
to the discussion of JW- and GS-utility functions.
In Example 2, it has been shown that if theHurwicz index is a constant the Jaffraymodel is not consistent under ignorance.
A unanswered question is whether allowing α to be dependent on the extreme outcome values as described in the original
paper [12] could make Jaffray model consistent under ignorance?
Theorem 3 provides a clear answer to this question. vJW is consistent under ignorance iff vJW (e[x,y]) has the form of
Eq. (18).
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vJW (e[x,y]) = γ (x, y) = α(x, y)x + (1 − α(x, y)y). (19)
Set x = 0, y = 1, γ (0, 1) = a = (1 − α(0, 1)), hence, α(0, 1) = 1 − awhere a is the constant in Eq. (18). Using Eqs. (18)
and (19), solve for α(x, y) yields
α(x, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if x ≤ y ≤ a,
y−a
y−x if x ≤ a ≤ y,
1 if a ≤ x ≤ y.
(20)
Technically, one can use Eq. (20) to argue that if α is allowed to depend on outcome ranges, Hurwicz criterion is compatible
with consistency. But the equation renders the interpretation of α as decision maker’s pessimism index or uncertainty
attitude unconvincing. We believe that an appropriate conclusion is that the Hurwicz criterion, a linear combination of
extreme values, is not a suitable way to evaluate acts under ignorance.
Corollary 1. (i) v(eB) given in (5) satisfies unanimity and dominance but does not satisfy decomposability in Theorem 3 unless
α = 0 or α = 1;
(ii) u(dB) given in (14) satisfies all three conditions in Theorem 3: unanimity, dominance and decomposability.
By the proof of part (ii), note that GS-utility function u and the real function (18) look very different but are identical in
terms of behavior. Also the critical value a in Theorem 3 gets useful interpretation a = t−1(〈1, 1〉) i.e., a is the certainty
equivalence of a “fair” possibilistic lottery that delivers 1 and 0 with the same possibility. According to Eq. (18), (a) if all the
outcomes in B are less preferable to the fair lottery then GS-utility evaluate eB equivalent to the best element of B; (b) on the
other hand, if all the outcomes in B are more preferable to the fair lottery then GS-utility evaluate eB to the worst element
of B; and (c) if B has elements on both sides of the fair lottery then eB is equivalent to the fair lottery. It is interesting to note
that the behavior in case (a) is consistent with the “optimistic” while (b) to the “pessimistic” modes of possibilistic decision
described in [6].
In the case of complete ignorance while both JW- and GS-utilities satisfy Arrow–Hurwicz’s properties A through D,
JW-utility is not consistent while GS-utility is.
5.3. The case of possibility function
Example 3. Ω is constructed from two variables X, Y whose domains have two values X = {x1, x2} and Y = {y1, y2} i.e.,
Ω = {x1y1, x1y2, x2y1, x2y2}. Suppose belief functionm on Ω has three nested foci (possibility function):
Focus Ω x1y1, x2y1, x2y2 x1y1, x2y1
Mass 0.3 0.2 0.5
Let us consider a two-stage act. The first stage is resolved on X . If X = x1 then the DM gets L1. If X = x2 then the DM
gets L2. The second stage is resolved on Y . If Y = y1 then both L1 and L2 yield 1. Y = y2 then both L1 and L2 yield 0. Use
in-line notation d = {x1 ↪→L1, x2 ↪→L2} where L1 = L2 = {y1 ↪→1, y2 ↪→0}. d has an equivalent one-stage version: d1 ={{x1y1, x2y1} ↪→ 1, {x1y2, x2y2} ↪→ 0}. First, let us use JW-utility. We have d(Ω) = {0, 1}, d({x1y1, x2y1, x2y2}) = {0, 1}
and d({x1y1, x2y1}) = {1}. So the belief function f onO induced by d andm has 2 focimf ({0, 1}) = 0.5 andmf ({1}) = 0.5.
JW-utility for this lottery is v(f ) = 0.5v(e{0,1}) + 0.5v(e{1}). Because v(e{0,1}) = 1 − α and v(e{1}) = 1,
v(f ) = 1 − 0.5α. (21)
Let us now consider the second stage lotteries. In order to do that, we compute two conditional belief functions obtained
fromm by conditioning on X = x1 and X = x2 respectively. 3 It is described in the following table.
Foci Ω x1y1, x2y1, x2y2 x1y1, x2y1
Mass 0.3 0.2 0.5
Conditioning event x1y1, x1y2
Conditioned foci x1y1, x1y2 x1y1 x1y1
Conditioning event x2y1, x2y2
Conditioned foci x2y1, x2y2 x2y1, x2y2 x2y1
3 Recall that conditioning a belief function on an event consists of moving the mass of an original focus to the focus obtained by taking intersection of the
original focus with the observed event and then consolidating (adding up) masses that are assigned to the same focus.
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Denote the conditionals onX = xi bymxi .We havemx1({x1y1, x1y2}) = 0.3 andmx1({x1y1}) = 0.7;mx2({x2y1, x2y2}) =
0.5 and mx2({x2y1}) = 0.5. mxi induce belief function on O denoted by fi. We have mf1({0, 1}) = 0.3, mf1({1}) = 0.7,
mf2({0, 1}) = 0.5 andmf2({1}) = 0.5. Calculating JW-utility for those lotteries yields v(f1) = 0.3(1−α)+0.7 = 1−0.3α
and v(f2) = 0.5(1 − α) + 0.5 = 1 − 0.5α.
Now let us consider the first stage of the decision that is if X = x1 then the outcome isw1 = 1− 0.3α and if X = x2 then
the outcome isw2 = 1−0.5α. The restriction of the original belief function on partitionH = {{x1y1, x1y1}, {x2y1, x2y1}} is
vacuous belief function. So the induced belief function onO is e{w1,w2} whose JW-utility is v(e{w1,w2}) = α w1 + (1−α)w2
v(e{w1,w2}) = 1 − 0.5α + 0.2α2. (22)
The difference between (21) and (22) indicates that JW-utility is not consistent, therefore, the folding-back procedure can
not be applied.
Nowwe turn to GS-utility. Let us compute for d. Assume t(1) = 〈1, 0〉 and t(0) = 〈0, 1〉. Conditional plausibilities given
x1 and x2 are:
Conditionals Y = y1 Y = y2
Plx1 1.0 0.3
Plx2 1.0 0.5
For secondstageacts, underPlx1 ,u(L1) = t−1(cmax{〈1, 0〉 , 0.3 〈0, 1〉})=t−1(〈1, 0.3〉). UnderPlx2 ,u(L2)=t−1(cmax{〈1, 0〉 ,
0.5 〈0, 1〉}) = t−1(〈1, 0.5〉). For the first stage, because Pl(X = x1) = 1 and Pl(X = x2) = 1, under Pl
u(d) = t−1(cmax{〈1, 0.3〉 , 〈1, 0.5〉}) = t−1(〈1, 0.5〉). (23)
Clearly, Pl({x1y1, x2y1}) = 1 and Pl({x1y2, x2y2}) = 0.5 and therefore
u(d1) = t−1(cmax{〈1, 0〉 , 0.5 〈0, 1〉}) = t−1(〈1, 0.5〉). (24)
Comparing (23) and (24), we see that for GS-utility one-stage and two-stage views are equivalent, hence, it is consistent. 
Theorem 4. Suppose Pl is a possibility function and H is an arbitrary partition, Giang–Shenoy’s evaluation model is consistent
wrt H.
In the case of possibility function, JW-utility is not consistent while GS-utility is so wrt any partition of Ω .
5.4. Sequential consistency and decision trees
In this section, we combine the results of Theorems 2 and 4 to examine the consistency when acts represented by trees.
Definition 9. A decision tree is a rooted tree whose root is labeled with Ω . Each branch is labeled by an event. Each node,
except the root, has exactly one branch leading into it. The labels of all branches emanating from a node form a partition of
the event of the branch leading to the node. The leaf nodes are labeled with outcomes. A set of nodes in a tree is called a cut
if their labels form a partition of Ω .
The familiar fold-back procedure starts from the leaves of a tree and works iteratively backward to the root. In each step,
a parent node of leaves is evaluated. The evaluated value is used to label the node and then all branches emanating from it
are removed.
Definition 10. An evaluation model M is sequentially consistent wrt decision tree f under belief function Pl if the value
M(Pl, f ) can be found at the root of the tree as a result of an application of the fold-back procedure in which at each step, a
node with label A is evaluated byM(PlA, fA).
Corollary 2. Under pcb given in Definition 6
(i)MGS is sequentially consistent wrt tree f if there is a cut consisted of nodes labeled with minimally unambiguous events (ref.
to Definition 1).
(ii)MJW is sequentially consistent wrt tree f if there is a cut consisted of nodes labeled with minimally unambiguous events such
that each of the nodes is a parent of the leaf nodes.
Before proceeding with proof, note that the difference between (i) and (ii) is illustrated in Fig. 1. On the left, forMGS ,
the minimally unambiguous cut is allowed to be in anywhere while on the right, forMJW , the cut must be in the last stage
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Fig. 1. Cuts: non-final-stage cut (left) and final-stage cut (right).
Fig. 2. The topology of foci: separate (A1 and A2) and nested (A1 and A
′
2).
i.e., consists of the parents of the leaves. The result for the JW model is similar to the results of Sarin and Wakker [19] and
Eichberger et al. [7] for Schmeidler’s Choquet expected utility model of decision under ambiguity.
6. General belief functions vs. pcb in Dempster’s interpretation
We have seen the comparison of Jaffray–Wakker’s approach and Giang–Shenoy’s approach in the case of pcb where both
are applicable. However, one may argue that as the former can be used for general belief functions while the latter only
for the pcb class, the failure of consistency in certain situations is the price to pay for some gain in generality. We’ll argue
that is not the case. There are two related-but-different issues in play here: decision under ignorance and decision under
ambiguity.
The inconsistency in the JW approach under ignorance and possibility function is traced back to the choice of Hurwicz’s
criterion for elementary belief functions, vJW (eB) in Eq. (5). This choice is made independently of the “weak sure-thing
principle” and “mixture continuity” requirements. So, an immediate solution to the problem is to replace the formula to
evaluate an act under ignorance from vJW (eB) by u(dB) in (14)
v(f ) = ∑
B⊆O
mf (B) t
−1(
〈
λB , ρ⊥B
〉
). (25)
This solution still satisfies the weak sure-thing principle and mixture continuity and moreover, satisfies consistency under
ignorance.
The second issue can be best illustrated by an example (Fig. 2). Assume a belief function with two foci:m(A1) = 0.4 and
m(A2) = 0.6. Act d has d(A1) = B1 and d(A2) = B2 where B2 ⊆ B1 ⊆ O. In Jaffray–Wakker’s model
vJW (d) = 0.4 vJW (eB1) + 0.6 vJW (eB2). (26)
This formula does not depend on the “topology” of A1 and A2 i.e., whether they are separate, overlapping or nested.
In Giang–Shenoy’s approach, however, the solution depends on that topology. In the case of overlap i.e., A1 ∩ A2 = ∅,
A1 \ A2 = ∅ and A2 \ A1 = ∅, it is not applicable theoretically. In the case of separation i.e., A1 ∩ A2 = ∅
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u(d) = 0.4 u(eB1) + 0.6 u(eB2)
= 0.4 t−1
(〈
λB1 , ρ⊥B1
〉)
+ 0.6 t−1
(〈
λB2 , ρ⊥B2
〉)
. (27)
In the case when foci are nested, e.g., A1 ⊃ A2 (hence B1 ⊇ B2) one has a possibility function with Pl(A1) = 0.4 and
Pl(A2) = 1
u(d) = t−1 (cmax ({0.4 t(w)|w ∈ B1} ∪ {t(w)|w ∈ B2}))
= t−1
(
cmax
(〈
0.4λB1 , 0.4ρ⊥B1
〉
,
〈
λB2 , ρ⊥B2
〉))
. (28)
Example 4. In order to give numerical sense to the calculation, let us assume B1 = [0, 1], B2 = [0.1, 0.3] and Hurwicz’s
coefficient α = 0.45
vJW (d) = 0.4(0.45 ∗ 0 + 0.55 ∗ 1) + 0.6(0.45 ∗ 0.1 + 0.55 ∗ 0.3) = 0.35.
To compute GS-utility, let assume equalities t(1) = 〈1, 0〉; t(0) = 〈0, 1〉; t(0.3) = 〈0.64, 1〉 and t(0.1) = 〈.17, 1〉 (these
equalities follow from assuming ambiguity attitude γ = 0.4, for more details see [10, p. 386]). This means λB1 = 1;
ρB1 = 0; λ⊥B1 = 0; ρ⊥B1 = 1; λB2 = 0.64; ρB2 = 1; λ⊥B2 = .17 and ρ⊥B2 = 1. Plugging the numbers in (27) yields
u(d) = 0.34 when foci are separate and (28) yields u(d) = 0.3 when foci are nested. 
Eq. (27) is clearly different from (28). This difference is entirely attributed to the topology – not the mass – of the foci of
the original belief function. Foci, in the former case, are unambiguous while are ambiguous in the latter case. The question
whether the topology of foci should be ignored is essentially a question whether the ambiguity of uncertainty information
should be ignored.
In their model, Jaffray and Wakker [13,23] bypass the issue of ambiguity by assuming the “two-stage resolution of
uncertainty” based on Dempster’s interpretation of belief function [4] as the result of a probability function transformed by
amultiple-valuemapping.We argue that this assumption, in effect, disambiguates the foci of a belief function and therefore
converts it into a pcb on an extended state space.
SupposeK is a set of codebooks and Pr is a probability function onK that tells the probability of a codebook is being used.
A set-value mapping κ : K → 2Ω tells us for each codebook the set of messages it can produce. The probability Pr(z) for
z ∈ K is transferred to A = κ(z) ⊆ Ω . This creates a belief function with the foci of the form A = κ(z) which is assigned
mass calculated by
∑{Pr(w)|κ(w) = A}.
Normally, given a belief function, it is implicitly assumed that only the message level (Ω) is known. In the two-stage
resolution model, in addition, K and mapping κ are also known. For example, suppose a receiver gets message s ∈ κ(z1) ∩
κ(z2) that can be produced by both codebooks z1 and z2. Under normal circumstance, this is the only information it knows.
However, under the two-stage uncertainty resolution, the receiver also knows which of the codebooks is actually used. This
is called disambiguation.
Let us extendΩ to the product spaceK×Ω inwhichwe define a belief functionm to represent our information. Themass
Pr(z)will be assigned to the set z ·κ(z) i.e.,m(z ·κ(z)) 
→ Pr(z). Clearly, these foci are non-overlapping. The obtained belief
function is a special pcb. This pcb is decomposed into a probability function Pr (on the algebra formed from {z ·κ(z)|z ∈ K})
and conditional ignorance i.e., vacuous belief function.
Generally, in the product space, we can consider richer acts whose outcome not only depend on state in Ω but also on
K i.e., δ : K × Ω → O. Any conventional act d : Ω → O can be mapped to an extended act δ as follows: ∀z ∈ K,∀s ∈
Ω, δ(z · s) 
→ d(s). And for δ, GS-utility (13) can be used.
u(δ) = ∑
z∈K
Pl(z ·κ(z)) t−1(cmax{t(w)|w ∈ δ(z ·κ(z))}) (29)
= ∑
z∈K
Pr(z) t−1(cmax{t(w)|w ∈ d(κ(z))}) (30)
=∑
i
m(Ai) t
−1(cmax{t(w)|w ∈ d(Ai)}) (31)
=∑
i
m(Ai) t
−1(〈d(Ai),⊥d(Ai)〉) , (32)
where Ai are the foci of the belief function on Ω induced by Pr and κ .
Two remarks are in order. First, (32) is identical to the new version of JW utility (25) which differs from Jaffray–Wakker’s
formula (6) only by the evaluation of acts under ignorance. Second, all the references to K and κ in (29) disappear in (32).
The absence of reference toK and and κ can create an impression that such information does not matter and (6) or (32) can
be used for an arbitrary belief function. This conclusion is a fallacy4 because, as we have seen, the information about K and
4 Perhaps, Wakker recognizes this problem as he carefully uses the formulation “Dempster belief functions” rather than the usual “Dempster–Shafer belief
functions” in [23].
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κ is used to disambiguate the foci and thus makes the difference in the ways masses/plausibilities are employed in utility
formula, e.g., the difference between (27) and (28).
In sum, the users who apply Jaffray–Wakker’s model for arbitrary belief functions often neglect the subtle assumption
about “two-stage resolution of uncertainty” on which themodel is justified. In doing so, they ignore the effects of ambiguity
in decision making. If the assumption holds, an arbitrary belief function on Ω is equivalent to a pcb in the extended space
K× Ω . The GS model for this pcb yields an expression similar to JW-utility.
7. Other models of decision making with belief functions
We have compared Jaffray–Wakker’s model and Giang–Shenoy’s model. In literature, there are others models, most
notably are those proposed by Yager [27] and Smets and Kennes [22].
According to Yager’s method, for belief function f on O with foci {Bi}Ki=1
vY (f ) =
K∑
i=1
m(Bi)vY (eBi). (33)
Yager’s formula is remarkably similar to (4) except that vY (eB) is computed according to the ordered weighted average (OWA)
method. Suppose B = {w1, . . . ,wk} and its elements are arranged in a decreasing order i.e., w1 > w2 > · · · > wk . Yager
assumes that for each DM, there are non-negative weights c1, c2, . . . , ck that sum to 1. vY (eB) = ∑ki=1 ci.wi.
OWA subsumes familiar criteria such as max (c1 = 1), min (ck = 1), Hurwicz’s (c1 = 1 − α, ck = α). The weights that
are determined by a linear programming procedure can vary depending on the size of B. Not only a weight set has to be
determined for each subset size, it is not clear how this procedure is justified from axiomatic perspective. Without going
into details, note that, except three special casesmentioned above, vY (eB) accounts for non-extreme values in B, hence, OWA
does not satisfy Arrow–Hurwicz’s postulates for decision under ignorance [1] or consistency.
Smets and Kennes [21,22] describe an approach called the transferable belief model (TBM) in which “beliefs can be held
at two levels: (1) a credal level where beliefs are entertained and quantified by belief functions, (2) a pignistic level where
belief can be used to make decisions and are quantified by probability functions.” Given a belief function with foci {Bi}Ki=1,
probability function Prb defined by dividing the mass of each focus evenly on its elements:
∀s ∈ Ω, Prb(s) =
∑
Bi⊇s
m(Bi)
|Bi| and ∀A ⊆ Ω, Prb(A) =
∑
s∈A
Prb(s). (34)
The expected utility of act dwrt Prb
vT (d) =
∑
s∈Ω
Prb(s) d(s) =
K∑
i=1
m(Bi)
∑
s∈Bi d(s)
|Bi| . (35)
It can be seen that (35) is a special case of (33)when all theweights ci are equal. As such, TBMmodel also does not satisfy the
requirements of decision under ignorance and consistency. It can be argued that in this approach, the problem of decision
under ignorance does not even exist because the notions of ignorance and ambiguity are meaningful in the “credal level”
only. They cease to exist when it comes to decision.
Like Jaffray–Wakker’s model, Yager’s and TBM models do not account for the topology of foci of belief functions, hence,
ignore the effect of ambiguity in decision making.
8. Conclusion
This paper examines the proposals for decision making with Dempster–Shafer belief functions from the perspectives of
sequential consistency and rational decision under ignorance.
We formalize the concept of sequential consistency and analyze the behavior of Jaffray–Wakker’s model and Giang–
Shenoy’s model when belief function is partially consonant. We have shown that (i) both the JW model and the GS model
are sequentially consistentwrt any unambiguous partition (Theorem2); (ii) If belief is consonant (a possibility function), the
GSmodel is sequentially consistent wrt any partition but the JWmodel is not (Theorem 4). We identify sufficient conditions
for the evaluation of decision trees by folding-back in each model (Corollary 2).
We prove the necessary and sufficient condition for decision under ignorance to be sequentially consistent (Theorem 3).
We conclude that Hurwicz’s α-criterion is not compatible with the sequential consistency property.
Finally, we refute the claim that the JW model is more general than the GS model because the former is applicable for
general belief functions while the latter only for partially consonant ones. Contrary to common perception, we show that
the assumption of two-stage resolution of uncertainty in the JW model actually disambiguates the foci of a belief function.
Neglecting this assumption is equivalent to assuming away the ambiguity in belief. Under two-stage assumption, any general
belief function can be represented by a pcb in the extended state space, hence the GS-model is applicable.
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Appendix. Proofs of statements
Lemma 1. We have to show that for any s ∈ Ω , f (s) and the outcome received act {Bk ↪→ fBk }Kk=1 is the same. Suppose f (Ω) = {wj|1 ≤
j ≤ J}, one can write the identity f = {f−1(wj) → wj}Jj=1. So fBk = {Bk ∩ f−1(wj) ↪→ wj}Jj=1. Since {Bk}Kk=1 is a partition of Ω ,
∪Kk=1(Bk ∩ f−1(wj)) = f−1(wj). For any s ∈ f−1(wj), there is k such that s ∈ Bk . On the one hand f (s) = wj . On the other hand, at s, Bk is
true and so is Bk ∩ f−1(wj), therefore act {Bk ↪→{Bk ∩ f−1(wj)↪→wj}Jj=1}Kk=1 delivers wj . 
Theorem 2. Assume pcb given in Definition 6 with focus structure A10 ⊃ A11 ⊃ · · · ⊃ A1n1 , A20 ⊃ A21 ⊂ · · · ⊃ A2n2 , . . . , Am0 ⊃ Am1 ⊃· · · ⊃ Amnm ,∪mi=1Ai0 = Ω and Ai0 ∩ Aj0 = ∅ for i = j; andH is the algebra of unambiguous events, in this case, formed from the collection{Ai0}mi=1.
If H = {Bk}Kk=1 is a unambiguous partition of Ω i.e., ∀k, Bk is unambiguous. For each Bk there is a set of indices denoted by Ik such that
Bk = ∪i∈Ik Ai0. For the restriction of Pl on H,
PlH(Bk) =
∑
i∈Ik
Pl(Ai0) =
∑
i∈Ik
ni∑
j=0
m(Aij). (36)
Because H is an unambiguous partition, the restriction PlH is a probability function. Specifically, for the masses, mH(Bk) = PlH(Bk). As for
conditional PlBk , it can be shown that the foci of this belief function are Aij for i ∈ Ik and 0 ≤ j ≤ ni i.e., the foci of the original belief function
that are inside Bk .
(a) We will show the sequential consistency forMJW . For arbitrary act f . Let f (Aij) = Cij
MJW (Pl, f ) =
m∑
i=1
ni∑
j=0
m(Aij)vJW (eCij ). (37)
Nowwe computeMJW (PlBk , fBk ). As noted PlBk has foci Aij with massesmBk (Aij) = m(Aij)/PlH(Bk). Clearly, fBk (Aij) = f (Aij) = Cij for i ∈ Ik .
MJW (PlBk , fBk ) =
∑
mBk (Aij)vJW (eCij ) =
∑
i∈Ikm(Aij)vJW (eCij )
PlH(Bk)
. (38)
Now we computeMJW (PlH, {Bk ↪→MJW (PlBk , fBk )Kk=1})
=
K∑
k=1
mH(Bk)MJW (PlBk , fBk ) (39)
=
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈Ik
m(Aij)vJW (eCij ) =
m∑
i=1
ni∑
j=0
m(Aij)vJW (eCij ) (40)
The equality of (37) and (40) implies the sequential consistency wrt H ofMJW .
(b) For Giang–Shenoy’s evaluation modelMGS
MGS(Pl, f ) =
m∑
i=1
Pl(Ai0) t
−1(cmax
j
{PlAi0(Eij)t(wj)}), (41)
where Eij = Ai0 ∩ f−1(wj) – the intersection of the pre-image of wj and Ai0. Consider conditional PlBk . It is again a pcb with foci Aij where
i ∈ Ik and the conditional mass is PlBk (Aij) = Pl(Aij)/Pl(Bk).MGS(PlBk , fBk )
=∑
i∈Ik
PlBk (Ai0) t
−1(cmax
j
{PlBk (Eij|Ai0)t(wj)}) (42)
= 1
Pl(Bk)
∑
i∈Ik
Pl(Ai0) t
−1(cmax
j
{PlAi0 (Eij)t(wj)}) (43)
because PlBk (Eij|Ai0) = PlBk (Eij)/PlBk (Ai0) = PlAi0 (Eij).
Because H is an unambiguous partition, PlH is probability.
MGS(PlH, {Bk ↪→MGS(PlBk , fBk )}Kk=1)
=
K∑
k=1
Pl(Bk)MGS(PlBk , fBk ) (44)
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=
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈Ik
Pl(Ai0) t
−1(cmax
j
{PlAi0(Eij)t(wj)}) (45)
=
m∑
i=1
Pl(Ai0) t
−1(cmax
j
{PlAi0 (Eij)t(wj)}) (46)
The equality of (41) and (46) shows thatMGS is sequentially consistent wrt H. 
Lemma 2. By property (iii), for x ≤ y ≤ 1, γ (x, 1) = γ (γ (x, y), γ (y, 1)). Set y = x and using property (i), we have a = γ (x, 1) =
γ (γ (x, x), γ (x, 1)) = γ (x, a). Set y = 1, a = γ (x, 1) = γ (γ (x, 1), γ (1, 1)) = γ (a, 1). It follows from property (ii) that for any y in the
interval [x, a], a = γ (x, a) ≤ γ (y, 1) ≤ γ (a, 1) = a. 
Theorem 3. (⇐) It is necessary to show that the function γ given by (18) is continuous on each argument and satisfy (i), (ii) and
(iii). For a fixed value x0, γ (x0, y) is continuous on y. In the case x0 ≤ a and if x0 ≤ b ≤ a limy→b γ (x0, y) = b = γ (x0, b). If
b ≥ a, limy→b γ (x0, y) = a = γ (x0, b). In the case x0 ≥ a, limy→b γ (x0, y) = x0 = γ (x0, b). Similarly, it can be shown that γ (x, y0)
is continuous on x for any fixed y0. The verification of the unanimity and the dominance is straightforward. Now we have to show the
decomposability (17). In the first case, if z ≤ a then γ (x, z) = z, γ (x, y) = y and γ (y, z) = z hence γ (γ (x, y), γ (y, z)) = γ (y, z) = z. In
the second case, if x ≥ a then γ (x, z) = x, γ (x, y) = x and γ (y, z) = y, hence γ (γ (x, y), γ (y, z)) = γ (x, y) = x. In the third case x ≤ a
and z ≥ a, γ (x, z) = a. If y ≤ a then γ (x, y) = y and γ (y, z) = a. Hence, γ (γ (x, y), γ (y, z)) = γ (y, a) = a. If y ≥ a, then γ (x, y) = a
and γ (y, z) = y, then γ (γ (x, y), γ (y, z)) = a.
(⇒) Suppose γ is a continuous function and satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii). Set a = γ (0, 1). Assume 0 < a < 1. By Lemma 2, γ (0, a) =
γ (a, 1) = a. By dominance if x ≤ a ≤ y then a ≤ γ (0, a) ≤ γ (x, y) ≤ γ (a, 1) = a. In other words, if arguments are in both sides of a
then γ (x, y) = a.
Now we consider the case when both arguments are on the same side of a. Assume that x, y ≥ a. Our goal is to show by contradiction
that γ (x, y) = x. Suppose, on the contrary, there exists x0, y0 ≥ a such that γ (x0, y0) > x0. Because of dominance γ (x0, 1) = x1 ≥
γ (x0, y0) > x0. By Lemma 2, x in the interval [x0, x1], γ (x, 1) = x1. Consider set Ax1 = {x|x ≥ a, γ (x, 1) = x1}. This set includes interval[x0, x1]. Choose a′ = inf Ax1 . Clearly, a ≤ a′ ≤ x0 < x1. For any x in the neighborhood of a′ and a′ < x ≤ x1, by the definition of a′, there
is a′ < x′ ≤ x such that x′ ∈ Ax1 . By Lemma 2, γ (x, 1) = x1.
Wewill show that for x < a′, γ (x, 1) ≤ a′. Suppose the contrary,γ (x3, 1) = a′′ > a′ for some x3 < a′. By Lemma2, for any x ∈ [x3, a′′],
γ (x, 1) = a′′. Clearly, the intersection (a′, x1] ∩ [x3, a′′] is not empty. For x in the intersection, γ (x, 1) = x1 and γ (x, 1) = a′′. Hence
x1 = a′′. Thus, for x3 < a′ and γ (x3, 1) = x1. This contradicts the fact that a′ is the infimum of Ax1 . So, γ (x, 1) ≤ a′ for x < a′. 
For a sequence {xi} that approaches a′ from bellow limxi↑a′ (γ (xi, 1)) ≤ a′. But for a sequence {yi} that approaches a′ from above
limyi↓a′ γ (yi, 1) = x1. So, γ (·, 1) is not continuous at a′. This contradiction shows that γ (x, y) = x for a ≤ x ≤ y. Similarly, one can show
that 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ a, γ (x, y) = y. 
Corollary 1. (i) For vα(x, y) = αx+(1−α)y, it is clear that vα is continuous on each argument, and it satisfies unanimity anddominance.
Also for 0 < α < 1, there does not exist a ∈ [0, 1] such that vα satisfies the condition of function γ described in (18). In particular, for
x < y ≤ a, vα(x, y) < y = γ (x, y). For α = 0, v0(x, y) = y = γ (x, y) at a = 1. For α = 1, v1(x, y) = x = γ (x, y) at a = 0. By Theorem
3, vα(x, y) does not satisfy decomposability unless α = 0 or α = 1.
(ii) For a continuous mapping defined in Section 4.2, t : [0, 1] → Ψ where Ψ is given in (7), t(y)  t(x) iff y ≥ x. Let u(x, y) =
t−1(cmax{t(x), t(y)}). Set a = t−1(〈1, 1〉). Suppose t(x) = 〈λx, ρx〉 and t(y) = 〈λy, ρy〉.
In case 1, assume x ≤ y ≤ a, by the definition of t, t(a)  t(y)  t(x). By the definition of order  given in (8), 1 ≥ λy ≥ λx and
1 ≤ ρy ≤ ρx ≤ 1. So, ρy = ρx = 1.
u(x, y) = t−1(cmax{〈λx, ρx〉 , 〈λy, ρy〉})
= t−1(〈max(λx, λy),max(ρx, ρy)〉)
= t−1(〈λy, 1〉) = t−1(t(y)) = y.
In case 2, assume a ≤ x ≤ y, it follows that t(y)  t(x)  a. So λy ≥ λx ≥ 1 and ρy ≤ ρx ≤ 1. So, λy = λx = 1.
u(x, y) = t−1(〈max(λx, λy),max(ρx, ρy)〉)
= t−1(〈1, ρx〉) = t−1(t(x)) = x.
In case 3, assume x ≤ a ≤ y, we have λx ≤ 1 = λy and ρx = 1 ≥ ρy
u(x, y) = t−1(〈max(λx, λy),max(ρx, ρy)〉)
= t−1(〈1, 1〉) = t−1(t(a)) = a.
By Theorem 3, function u satisfies all three properties: unanimity. dominance and decomposability. 
Theorem 4. Let assume the only telescope of foci of the pcb is Ω = A0 ⊃ A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Am and H = {Bj}Jj=1. The restriction PlH of Pl on
H is a possibility function because Ω ∈ 2H and PlH(Ω) = Pl(Ω) = 1 and for A, B ∈ 2H , PlH(A ∪ B) = Pl(A ∪ B) = max(Pl(A), Pl(B)) =
max(PlH(A), PlH(B)). For act f = {Ci ↪→wi}mi=1
MGS(Pl, f ) = t−1(cmax
i
{Pl(Ci)t(wi)}). (47)
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For conditional act fBj = {(Ci ∩ Bj)↪→wi} and conditional possibility PlBj (Ci ∩ Bj) = Pl(Ci ∩ Bj)/Pl(Bj), we have:
MGS(PlBj , fBj ) = t−1(cmax
i
{PlBj (Ci ∩ Bj)t(wi)}). (48)
MGS(PlH, {Bj ↪→MGS(PlBj , fBj )}Jj=1)
= t−1(cmax
j
{PlH(Bj) t(t−1(cmax
i
{PlBj (Ci ∩ Bj)t(wi)}))}), (49)
= t−1(cmax
j
{PlH(Bj)cmax
i
{PlBj (Ci ∩ Bj)t(wi)}}), (50)
= t−1(cmax
j
{cmax
i
{Pl(Ci ∩ Bj)t(wi)}}), (51)
= t−1(cmax
i
{Pl(Ci)t(wi)}). (52)
Eq. (49) is obtained by the substitution of (48). (50) by the cancellation of tt−1. (51) by the fact that PlH(Bj) = Pl(Bj) and PlBj (Ci ∩ Bj) =
Pl(Ci ∩ Bj)/Pl(Bj). (52) is due to the fact that since {Bj}Kj=1 is a partition of Ω , ∪j(Ci ∩ Bj) = Ci and hence, max(Pl(Ci ∩ Bj)) = Pl(Ci). The
proof is complete by comparing (47) and (52). 
Corollary 2. First, because the unions of unambiguous events are again unambiguous, if there is an unambiguous cut then so is any ancestor
node of the cut. Therefore, any cut that is closer to the root that does not cross the minimally unambiguous cut is also unambiguous.
(i) For minimally unambiguous H = {Ai0}mi=1, by Theorem 2,MGS(Pl, f ) = MGS(PlH, {Ai0 ↪→MGS(PlAi0 , fAi0)}mi=0). Because each PlAi0 is
a possibility function, by Theorem 4,MGS(PlAi0 , fAi0 ) can be evaluated by folding-back on the subtree with root Ai0. As PlH is a probability
function on H,MGS(PlH, {Ai0 ↪→MGS(PlAi0 , fAi0 )}mi=0) can be evaluated by folding-back. Thus,MGS(Pl, f ) can be evaluated by folding-back
on tree f .
(ii) For minimally unambiguous H = {Ai0}mi=1, by Theorem 2, MJW (Pl, f ) = MJW (PlH, {Ai0 ↪→MJW (PlAi0 , fAi0 )}mi=0). Note also that
replacing act (decision tree) f by {Ai0 ↪→M(PlAi0 , fAi0 )}mi=0 means folding the nodes that are the parents of leaves in the decision tree. PlH is
a probability function on algebra H and the obtained tree has labels in this algebra. BecauseMJW reduces to expected utility model when
the belief function is a probability function, the fold-back procedure can be used to computeMJW (f H, {Ai0 ↪→MJW (PlAi0 , fAi0 )}mi=0). 
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